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Abstract
While enormous progress has been made in unraveling the proximate physiological mechanisms that account for anxiety, stress, and low
mood, these states continue to give rise to considerable conceptual confusion. This is, in part, because proximate studies have neither been
adequately distinguished from, nor integrated with, evolutionary explanations for the adaptive functions of anxiety, stress, and mood. A
complete biological explanation that incorporates both proximate and evolutionary explanations will be of great value to better define the
border between normal and pathological, to help to explain why pathological anxiety and depression are so common, and to provide a  much-
needed basis for sensible decisions about when different pharmacological manipulations are likely to be helpful or harmful. Ideally,
evolutionary considerations should provide a conceptual framework within which the biological significance of the proximate mechanisms
can be better understood, and the proximate findings should provide tests of evolutionary hypotheses. Studies at the interface between
evolutionary and proximate explanations will be difficult, but important to better understand individual differences in vulnerability and the
etiology of diseases that result from dysregulation of anxiety and mood. © 1999 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The extraordinary efforts we humans have made to under-
stand anxiety disorders and depression are entirely under-
standable. After all, the related states of fear and sadness are
two of the most common and severe kinds of human suffer-
ing. They are, like pain, aversive in their very essence. To
one degree or another, we all experience them and they are
thus very different from diseases like cancer or stroke,
which only affect some people. The proportion of people
who experience depression or anxiety of clinical  severity-
about one out of five people-is astounding, and is, in and
of itself, an important fact about these disorders  [l]. Even
more disturbing, their prevalence in the prime of life for
reproductive-aged women in developed societies results in
combined morbidity and mortality estimates, as reported by
the WHO, far greater than that of any other illness [2].  Other
than conditions related to reproduction, few common
diseases have their peak prevalence in the prime of repro-
ductive life.
Approaches to the problem have changed dramatically.
During the past century, millennia of philosophical investi-
gations of fear and sadness  [3] were displaced by psycho-
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logical approaches that have become progressively more
objective. In the past generation, traditional psychology
has been displaced by cognitive neuroscience, with its
new ability to unravel the responsible brain mechanisms
[4].  We now know the brain sites that regulate and express
aversive emotions  [5].  We know enough about the respon-
sible neurotransmitters to assist in designing new drugs
(although much of this knowledge has come, in fact, from
clinical observation drug effects). In addition, we are start-
ing to find out how the genes and brains of people who are
prone to anxiety and depression differ from those of other
people.
All this breathtaking progress has revealed, however,
some major gaps in our understanding. Arguments about
nature vs. nurture, psychology vs. physiology, social vs.
physical causes of mental disorders, and psychotherapy
vs. drug treatment, continue unabated, thus revealing that
the problem that is not just a lack of facts, but the absence of
a satisfactory conceptual framework that can incorporate
knowledge from different sources. Some of the difficulty
arises from the difficulty of distinguishing and integrating
work at different levels of organization-the molecule, the
cell, anatomic loci and the whole organism. However, much
of it arises at the awkward boundary between the proximate
and evolutionary halves of biology.
As so eloquently described by Mayr, the entire history of
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biology can be seen as two intertwined but separate threads
addressing proximate and evolutionary questions  [6].  The
proximate component of biology describes the body’s
mechanisms and their ontogeny. The evolutionary part
studies the functions of those mechanisms and their phylo-
geny. For instance, a full proximate explanation of rat attack
behavior would include a description of the behavior, the
situations that elicit and inhibit it, the brain locations that
mediate and regulate the behavior, the neurons and  neuro-
transmitters involved, the genes that create this system and
that account for its individual variations, and the develop-
ment of the system from the zygote to the adult organism.
Even if we knew every detail of this complete proximate
explanation, however, we would still also need a separate
evolutionary explanation for why the system is in the way it
is. At base, such evolutionary questions are about why the
DNA code has the sequence it has. To answer them, one
must understand why the DNA that gives rise to one kind of
phenotype tends to have higher Darwinian fitness than
phenotypes from other DNA sequences. Disembodied
DNA has no fitness, of course, so we must study the adap-
tive significance of a trait in a particular environment, and
we must try to understand how this trait evolved from its
precursors. In the case of rat attack behavior, there are clues
in the situations in which it is expressed-the sex, age and
reproductive strategy of rats showing the display, the effects
of the display on other organisms, and the competitive
ability of rats with artificially (or naturally) increased or
decreased tendencies to display the threat.
Both proximate and evolutionary studies have succeeded
far beyond what anyone could imagine just 50 years ago,
but the task of building strong bridges between them has yet
to be accomplished. On the evolutionary side, the field of
ethology has been transformed into modern behavioral ecol-
ogy where the adaptive significance of every behavior is
considered  [7].  On the proximate side, early forays into
biochemistry have resulted in a deep understanding of meta-
bolism and now the chemistry of genes and how they give
rise to bodies. However, neurobehavioral mechanisms are
just now penetrating ethology [8],  and evolutionary perspec-
tives are just beginning to influence neuroscience and
psychology  [4,9]. The results of the genome project will
no doubt provide the impetus for new efforts at integration.
Once we know the basic code and some of its variations, we
will be able to address, with far more specificity, the evolu-
tionary explanations for why certain genes have been
selected for, especially some with deleterious or apparently
deleterious effects. We may even be better able to under-
stand which allelic variations are maintained by selection,
and which are explained only by mutation and drift. In the
meanwhile, there are still many other good reasons to
emphasize the benefits of trying to integrate evolutionary
and proximate studies.
The thesis of this article is that much progress will come
from work at the interface between proximate and evolu-
tionary studies of anxiety, stress and mood. Knowledge
about proximate mechanisms can provide crucial evidence
to support or refute evolutionary hypotheses about why
traits are in the way they are. An evolutionary perspective
can help to unravel why the mechanisms are there in the first
place, why the regulation systems work as they do, and why
we are so vulnerable to depression, anxiety disorders, and
the adverse effects of stress.
The strongest evidence in support of synergy between
these perspectives is the major benefits this strategy has
provided for the field of animal behavior. Most studies of
animal behavior now incorporate both proximate and evolu-
tionary explanations, while the rest are explicit about the
specific proximate or evolutionary questions at issue  [8].
Before similar benefits can be realized from integrating
studies of function and mechanism in emotional disorders
however, several obstacles need to be overcome:
1. The distinction between proximate and evolutionary
explanations needs to be clarified, along with their
complementary roles in a full biological explanation.
2. The different methods for formulating and testing prox-
imate and evolutionary hypotheses need to be recog-
nized.
3. A modern understanding of how natural selection works
must be incorporated.
4. Explanations of individual differences need to be recog-
nized as quite different from explanations of why all
members of a species are vulnerable to a disease.
5. Special strategies need to be pursued for the study of
pathology that results from dysregulation of a defense
as compared to primary pathology that does not involve
defenses.
6. The tendency to equate aversive experience with pathol-
ogy must be tempered.
1.1. Separate, complementary questions
While most scientists know the basic distinction between
proximate and evolutionary explanations, an outline of
some details will lay the groundwork for further exposition.
Proximate approaches are about structures or systems and
the mechanics of the organism, from molecules to cells,
tissues, organs and behavior. Even if the reductionist’s
dreams were realized, however, even if we had a complete
model of how the organism develops from DNA to an adult,
and the location of every cell and its regulation and inter-
connections, this would still not offer a complete biological
explanation.
As Tinbergen pointed out so clearly, a complete biologi-
cal explanation has four components: (1) mechanism, (2)
development, (3) function, and (4) phylogeny [IO].
Together, mechanism and development offer a complete
proximate explanation, but they cannot explain why a trait
or mechanism is in the way it is. That requires an evolu-
tionary explanation. A complete evolutionary explanation is
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would require knowing (1) the precursor trait, (2) its minor
variations, (3) the genes responsible for those variations, (4)
how those variations increased or decreased fitness in
response to the selective forces of earlier environments,
and (5) the random effects of drift and other chance factors.
A partial explanation is usually possible, however, based on
what we know about ancestral traits, comparative data, and
about the selection forces that are likely to have shaped the
observed trait  [ 11,121. Testing these explanations requires
methods different from those used for proximate studies; so
misunderstanding is easy. Probably the most common and
serious misunderstanding, however, is the failure to recog-
nize that both evolutionary and proximate explanations are
needed, and that they are not competitors, but two halves of
a whole.
1.2. Natural selection
The basic notion of natural selection is widely under-
stood-the gene pool changes over the generations because
certain genes give individuals an advantage and thus
become more common. Outside of evolutionary biology,
however, some subtleties are often missed. The advantage
given by successful genes has entirely to do with reproduc-
tion, not health or longevity. If individuals with a genetic
variation tend to have more children than other people, that
genetic variation will likely become more common, even if
it causes health problems or early death. The notion that
natural selection shapes individuals for health and longevity
is a common misconception. The simplest example is one
with manifold consequences for human health. In most
populations, men die about 7 years earlier, on the average,
than women. A proximate explanation can be based on the
presence of testosterone, its deleterious effects on health and
its tendency to induce men to do dangerous things. Why,
then, are not high testosterone levels selected against? It is
almost certainly because that would decrease ability to
compete for mates, a hypothesis that is supported by
comparative studies that show increasing sex differences
in life-spans associated with increased reproductive pay-
offs for mate competition [ 131. Put in other terms, an invest-
ment in competitive ability early in life at the expense of
ability to repair tissues give a greater reproductive pay-off
for males, while for females, the pay-off is greater for
investments in tissue integrity. This is the evolutionary
explanation for why natural selection has made males the
frail sex.
This is an example of sexual selection. It is not a different
kind of selection, but a subset of natural selection in which
traits are preserved if they give a reproductive advantage
either by increasing ability to compete for mates, or making
the individual more attractive as a mate  [14]. There is, of
course, a trade-off between the advantages of increased
reproduction, and the costs of not being able to attend
adequately to other needs, often with dire results for the
individual’s health. Some sexually selected traits are
apparently extreme and specifically because they are expen-
sive and thus provide a hard to fake signal that the individual
has surplus resources [ 151.
Group selection is also still frequently misunderstood. In
the first half of the 20th century, biologists uncritically
accepted the notion that natural selection could be shaped
for the good of the species or the group. It seemed sensible.
After all, if individuals did not help the group, the entire
group would die with all the individuals in it. More recently,
however, nearly all biologists have recognized that a gene
that gives an individual a reproductive advantage will
usually be selected even if that hurts the group, while a
gene that is costly to individuals will be eliminated even
if it benefits the group  [16]. Attempts to resurrect a  neo-
group-selectionism [  171 do not undermine this basic conclu-
sion. Thus, explanations of hierarchies based on benefits to
the group, or submissive displays for group harmony, or
suicide of some individuals for the good of the group are
inconsistent with basic evolutionary theory.
Finally, there is the matter of selection ending at a certain
point in life. Since the discovery of kin selection [ 181, it has
been clear that a post-reproductive individual can do things
that benefit copies of his or her own genes that reside in kin.
Menopause, far from being a barrier to further effects on
gene frequencies, has been suggested to be a strategy to
maximize reproductive success  [19], although there is
much controversy about this suggestion  [20].
1.3. Explaining differences vs. explaining similarities
Another major source of misunderstanding arises because
much clinically based research aims to explain the etiology
of diseases by finding individual differences, while most
evolutionary research tries to explain why all members of
a species have a trait in common. Evolutionary explanations
rarely focus on why one individual gets sick and another
does not, but they have a great deal to say about why all
members of a species are vulnerable to some disorders but
not others. Darwinian medicine is the field that attempts to
understand why natural selection leaves us vulnerable to
various diseases  [21].
The global evolutionary explanations for vulnerability to
disease can be organized into just a few categories  [22]:
1. Defenses that appear to be pathology but usually are not,
such as the capacities for pain, fever, vomiting, fatigue,
anxiety, stress responses, and low mood.
2. Design features that increase reproduction at a cost to
health or longevity, such as the tendency for males to
die young, as described above.
3. Genes that foster their own transmission at a cost to the
individual, such as the T-locus in mice, and other exam-
ples of meiotic drive.
4. Competition with other organisms. The obvious source
of disease in this category is pathogens. However,
competition with predators has been a major issue until
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major source of ill health, whether from physical attack
or from social conflicts. The co-evolution of strategies
and counter-strategies, and defenses and ways to get
around those defenses, is an arms race that shapes
mechanisms just as prone to excess and danger as those
in a military arms race  [23]. Our immune system is a
good example. With its chronic damage to tissues and
occasional autoimmune responses, it is a source of much
disease, but because of the need to defend against
constantly changing potentially fatal invaders, its
excesses are products of natural selection that give a
net benefit.
5. The mismatch between novel aspects of our current
environment and our bodies, which were designed for a
very different environment, is the cause of perhaps the
majority of modern disease. Atherosclerosis and hyper-
tension are rare in people living in the ancestral environ-
ment, while they now eventually affect most of us  [24].
The vast amounts of disease caused by cigarettes, alcohol
and drugs are results of our novel environment. Obesity
and associated diabetes and other problems also are rare
outside of technological cultures. Whether the high rates
of depression and anxiety disorders we now see are an
epidemic caused by novelties in our social or physical
environments remains uncertain  [25].
6. Constraints, such as path dependence and engineering
trade-offs make us vulnerable to many diseases. While
engineering trade-offs are intrinsic in any design for any
machine, the body is particularly prone to constraints that
arise because the body is the result of a continuous line-
age from one-celled organisms with no fresh starts. With
anticipation, much could have been done better. While
the design of the human back is a particularly egregious
maldesign, the routes of the recurrent laryngeal nerve and
vas  deferens  is equally nonsensical, and equally unalter-
able. It seems inevitable that our cognitive and emotional
capacities suffer under similar constraints, but it is hard
to see what they might be.
7. Random factors also prevent perfection. At the species
level, the vagaries of natural selection are evident in
examples of deleterious genes that are perpetuated by
drift and, undoubtedly, in genes and traits that would
be useful but got lost in the stochastic shuffle  [12]. A
cornea that filters out ultraviolet wavelengths would be
a boon, as would the capacity to manufacture vitamin C.
At the individual level, mutations have their effects,
as do random events and genes that cause disease
only in particular combinations. These random factors
are potent, but they are intentionally last on the list in
order to counter the common misconception that the
body is suboptimal mainly because natural selection is
a random process and therefore cannot be expected to be
all that effective. In fact, there are at least six other
reasons why the body is not better, and they account
for far more design defects than the randomness of
natural selection.
This article emphasizes the defense functions of aversive
emotions, but each of the other six areas can contribute to
understanding psychopathology.
1.4. Explaining pathological dysregulation  of  defenses vs.
direct pathology
Imagine, for a moment, if medical science approached the
study of pain the way it approaches the study of anxiety and
depression. Pain would be said to be caused by abnormal
activity in the thalamus, and enormous efforts would go into
finding out why some people are more vulnerable to pain
than others. People with a tendency to experience pain read-
ily would be examined to see if this tendency was genetic or
acquired. Much would be made of the extraordinary propor-
tion of the population who had experienced a pain disorder,
as defined by a period of 2 weeks or more in which pain
disrupted normal work or activities. Subtypes of pain dis-
order would be defined by the results of factor analytic
studies of symptoms and course. Brain scans would reveal
the site of abnormal brain function and the efficacy of anti-
inflammatory drugs and opiates would incriminate the  cyto-
kine and the opiate systems as potential causes.
All of this is ludicrous of course, but only because we
know that pain is useful. While there are variations in
susceptibility to pain, we know that most of these represent
different points on the normal distribution of a useful
response that evolved to protect  us  from tissue damage.
We certainly recognize syndromes of pathological pain,
but we usually seek the defect in dysregulation of the
response, not the mechanisms of the response itself. When
we see someone with a congenital absence of pain, we
realize this is abnormal and are not surprised to learn that
most of such people die by early adulthood  [26]. A phylo-
genetic perspective on pain confirms its utility, the conser-
vation of mechanisms across phyla, and subtle associations
among developmental factors and pain mechanisms  [27].
The big difference between physical pain and the mental
pains of anxiety and depression is that the source of physical
pain is so much more readily identified. We can often see
the cause of physical pain, so it is easy to see that it is a
defense. With fear, the correlation is not quite so clear, but
we all experience its quick arousal by something that has
previously hurt us, and this makes it easy to see how fear
could prevent future harm. Some anxiety, however, arises in
the absence of any obvious external cue and thus is more
likely to be labeled abnormal. Indeed, many approaches to
anxiety tacitly assume that it is abnormal, and that it can be
completely explained by the brain mechanisms that mediate
it. In the proximate sense, it can, of course, but this approach
confounds an explanation of the operation of the normal
mechanism with the factors that cause disorders of anxiety
regulation in some people and with the normal functions of
those mechanisms. A proximate explanation cannot explain
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is regulated the way it is, and why we are so susceptible to
anxiety disorders.
Low mood and depression are still more problematic. The
situations that give rise to them are often internal and related
to idiosyncratic individual goals. The stimulus is often a loss
that has already occurred, so it is hard to see how a reaction
now can be useful and the very phenomena that constitute
depression seem patently pathological. How could it
possibly be useful to not want to do anything, to feel fatigue,
to not eat or sleep, to not want sex? Then there are low self-
esteem, social withdrawal, and thoughts of  suicide-
phenomena that seem utterly without value. For all of
these reasons, it is easy to interpret depression as akin to
seizures or stroke-pathological experiences unrelated to
any useful function. This is, however, a mistake. Depressed
mood is not a condition that is always pathological, that
occurs only to a small subset of people, and that is unregu-
lated by life situation. It is far more like pain or cough than
seizures or stroke.
The same difficulty is prevalent in the rest of medicine.
While the utility of cough is widely recognized, the utility of
fever, fatigue, vomiting and diarrhea are not so clear in the
minds of many physicians, and the low iron levels asso-
ciated with chronic infection are recognized by few  [28].
Therefore, these protective defenses are often seen as the
problem, and drugs are given to block them with little
thought to possible negative consequences. Several factors
conspire to conceal the utility of defenses. Firstly, the body
has redundant defense mechanisms, so eliminating one may
have few ill effects. Secondly, many defenses are regulated
in a way that seems overly responsive. When defenses that
are inexpensive, such as pain and anxiety, protect against
potentially severe dangers, such as further injury or being
killed, selection will tend to shape a regulation mechanism
that expresses the defense at the least hint of the presence of
the dangerous situation. This “smoke detector principle”
explains why so many expressions of defenses are unneces-
sary but nonetheless perfectly normal  [22]. Third, if an
agent does cause harm, it is in the context of an illness to
which the problem is readily attributed. For instance, it
seems possible that some cases of septic shock are caused
by cytokine dysregulation induced by antipyretic drugs [29].
However, this is hard to recognize clinically-such agents
are widely used, so there is no easy way to associate the
complication with the drug.
Finally, there is the subjective aversiveness associated
with the expression of defenses. The capacity for suffering
itself seems to be a part of the motivational system to get us
to escape from situations that involve loss or danger, and to
avoid them in the future  [30]. As already noted, people who
lack the capacity for pain die young [26]. What about people
who lack the capacity for anxiety? Few such studies have
been done. In one, rate of injury in falls was examined for
men who had or had not had a severe injury from a fall in
childhood. Contrary to expectations, the fall in childhood
did not cause increased fear. Instead, those men who (were
so incautious to) fall in childhood were much less likely to
have fears in adult life  [3 l] ! Overall, however, the syndrome
of hypophobia remains unstudied, probably because few
patients come to anxiety disorder clinics complaining of
insufficient anxiety  [32].
2. Fear and anxiety
At the most basic level, movement offers animals two
advantages over most plants-going towards food or
mates, and away from danger. Arousal in face of danger
increases the chances of escape, and thus gives an obvious
selective advantage. Once a state of defensive arousal has
been shaped by natural selection, its regulation will be
slowly modified so the state tends to be expressed when it
is useful and not at other times. Variations in  neuronal
connections that elicit the response in the presence of cues
when it is likely to be useful will be selected for, as well
connections that prepare an association pathway for ready
and enduring learning  [33]. Selection also can be expected
to steadily differentiate the state into subtypes to cope with
different kinds of threats  [32]. Thus, attack by a predator
will arouse the physiological changes and behavioral
tendencies of a panic attack, while a threat of falling arouses
paralysis and avoidance, and the dangers of display in a
social group elicit the inhibitions of social phobia. Two
kinds of defensive arousal, fear and panic, seem to have
fairly sharply distinct neural mediating mechanisms,
suggesting that they either arose in response to different
kinds of threats, or that the differentiation was early and
has been substantial  [34]. The importance of this principle
is that it helps us to stop thinking of each subtype of anxiety
as either separate or the same. It is more likely that they all
are partially differentiated from a common precursor state.
It also may help guide us towards principles that can help
distinguish normal from pathological anxiety. At present,
we attempt to make the distinction based on severity of
symptoms and how much they interfere with the normal
function. What is missing is a consideration of how much
anxiety would be optimal for this person, given his or her
experiences and environment. As noted above, there is a
strong tendency to ignore the smoke detector principle
and to label all unwanted anxiety as pathological. However,
the optimal regulation system will often express anxiety that
is excessive or even completely unnecessary for a given
situation, so that much useless anxiety is nonetheless
completely normal. We are so early in the process of explor-
ing the utility of anxiety that it is difficult to say much more.
What becomes of people who have too little social anxiety?
What advantages accrue to people with mild social appre-
hensions? We don not yet know.
We do know, however, that the regulation of anxiety can
be influenced by many different neurochemicals.  Benzodia-
zepines, of course, and antidepressants also. but in addition
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serotonin receptor, and the effects of myriad other  neuro-
transmitters. They allow a pharmaceutical dissection of the
anxiety system. This offers a fine opportunity to determine
the extent to which pharmacologically defined subtypes
match those defined by the situation they defend against
[35].
3. Stress
The modern concept of stress began with Selye’s obser-
vation that diverse kinds of noxious experiences all resulted
in the same syndrome including gastric ulcers and adrenal
hypertrophy  [36]. He recognized that this was a “general
adaptation syndrome” which caused pathology only when
aroused for an extended period. Cannon recognized that the
uniformity of the “fight flight” response could be explained
by the benefits an endangered organism received from
increased heart and respiratory rates, sweating, muscular
tone, and blood clotting  [37]. Since then, however, the
concept of stress has come more and more to be associated
with its abnormal consequences, so that the popular culture
now labels every untoward experience stressful, and seeks
to minimize stress to preserve health. A glimmer of recog-
nition of the utility of stress survives in the phrase “good
stress”, but the prevailing view is that stress is abnormal and
bad for the organism.
Like other special states, however, stress has been shaped
because it gives a net selective advantage. Exactly what
those advantages are remains somewhat an issue, but the
outlines are clear [38]. Arousal of the HPA system increases
gluconeogenesis, and the entry of glucose into cells changes
that are useful in situations where energy is being used. In
essence, arousal of the stress system adjusts metabolism for
rapid expenditure  [39].
Like every other bodily trait, it has trade-offs. In the case
of the stress response, these tend to cause tissue damage
[40]. A proximate explanation for stress is well developed
[4 1,421, but a simple evolutionary principle about the stress
response has not been widely appreciated. Many compo-
nents of the stress response are likely held in reserve, instead
of being expressed continuously, specifically because they
cause tissue damage. They are expressed only in those situa-
tions when the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs.
From this perspective, the pathology caused by chronic
exposure to stress is no mystery, but an expected outcome
of natural selection.
Many effects of hypothalamic pituitary axis (HPA)
arousal are surprising, however. Why, for instance, would
decreased immune and inflammatory response be useful in
situations where injury is likely?  Munck  [39] has suggested
that many effects of the HPA system are not designed to
protect the organism from outside harm, but to protect it
from damage that would be caused by other aspects of stress
arousal. The fatal effects of exposure to stress in the absence
of adrenal hormones support this plausible argument and
suggest possible benefits to increasing the focus of research
on the factors that shaped the peculiarities of the HPA
system.
Studies of immune suppression caused by stress have also
been conducted mostly in the proximate domain. However,
a look at the phylogeny of the HPA system reveals ACTH
like molecules in mollusks that are located in macrophages
[43]. This hints that the very origin of the HPA system may
have involved the stresses of infection and the body’s
responses to infection.
Most stress research now is conducted on psychological,
not physical stress, but has turned out not to be so easy to
find psychological cues that stimulate the HPA system. For
humans, even some extreme situations are not associated
with any cortisol response  [44]. The current best method
for arousing stress responses requires asking subjects to
participate in a sequence of embarrassing and socially
awkward scenarios  [45]. For rats, it has likewise been
found that social stress is especially effective in arousing
the HPA system and causing disease, although the arousal of
the HPA system is erratic  [46]. A variety of noxious situa-
tions is better than any constant stimulus to arouse stress in
rats. In the chronic mild stress procedure, the animal is
exposed to a predator, food deprivation, cage tilt, 24 h illu-
mination, and loud noises [47]. The attempt is, of course, to
simulate the situations that cause chronic stress in humans,
situations like chronic conflict with a spouse or employer, or
the experience of discrimination. That it is so difficult to find
a way to reliably arouse the HPA axis over the long term in
both rats and humans is an important fact in and of it.
Whether the experiences of modern humans arouse the
HPA system to a pathological extent or duration remains
an open question. It seems possible that many of the docu-
mented negative effects of exposure to stress are the adverse
trade-offs of a normal system, not any evidence for pathol-
ogy per se. Such trade-offs have been well documented in
Drosophila for heat stress  [48].
A particularly effective procedure to create stress has
been social defeat, especially if the loser is forced to live
next to the victor  [49]. The procedure seems especially
effective if the submissive rat is exposed to repeated attack
by the victor. In ethological terms, whether this situation is
natural or not depends on whether the rat perceives it as an
attack by another rat in the group who is higher in the
hierarchy, or if it is perceived as repeated attack by a strange
rat, a situation that would be rare in nature since the loser
would yield the territory. Overall, an ethological perspective
will increase the utility of existing animal models of anxiety
and suggest new ones  [50].
4. Depression
Much of the interest in stress models comes, of course,
from the association between stress and depression  [51].
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damage that eventually results in dysregulation of  neuro-
chemical systems yielding the syndrome of depression.
The evidence ranges from the HPA abnormalities that char-
acterize about half of patients with severe depression  [52],
to the effects of exogenous and excessive endogenous ster-
oids on mood  [53], to the extensive evidence that losses and
other negative life events precede many episodes of depres-
sion  [.54].
This model is based mostly on pathology, with little
concern for the possible functions of normal low mood
and the mechanisms that regulate it. As noted above, there
are several reasons why it is easy to neglect consideration of
the possible adaptive significance for low mood, starting
with its general aversiveness and its apparent uselessness.
The aversiveness of a state is a clue that it is an adaptation
for some situation that is best avoided. As for the apparent
uselessness of depression, compare it to pain, which
similarly inhibits normal function but is obviously useful.
The bigger difficulty, however, is that the situation to
which depression most often relates to is a loss in the
past. If the loss has already occurred, how can low mood be
useful now? The answer is that it can only be useful if it
influences future behavior in a way that avoids additional
losses.
Is loss of a reproductive resource the main situation that
has shaped the characteristics of low mood? Put another
way, in what situations might the characteristics of depres-
sion be useful? There may not be one specific situation. Just
as there are subtypes of anxiety, there well may be subtypes
of low mood to cope with different situations, from being
discouraged, to loss of a loved one, to being trapped in an
impossible life situation. What they all have in common is a
general decrease in activity and motivation, often associated
with low self-esteem and pessimism. The global situation in
which an organism is best off withdrawing and decreasing
its effort is one in which that effort would be wasted or make
a situation worse  [55]. A confrontation with a dominant, for
instance, is wasted effort that is likely to result in injury. A
great deal of work to study yielding behaviors has been done
by Price et al.  [56,57]. Animal models based on arrested
flight offer particular promise  [58]. Other more global situa-
tions are similar, for instance, foraging at a time of day or
year when the calories spent are greater than the calories
gained. Whether reactions to such situations are regulated
by the same mechanisms that regulate submissive behavior
and arrested flight offers an example of how proximate data
can help to test evolutionary hypotheses.
Some other animal models are along similar lines. In the
learned helplessness paradigm, for instance, animals quit
trying to escape from a setting where they have initially
found escape to be impossible  [59]. This is generally inter-
preted as pathological behavior, and treatment is conceptua-
lized as demonstrating to the animal that it has more control
over its environment than it apparently thinks it does  [60].
However, is there any natural setting similar to the shuttle
box? It would have to be some location that was associated
with pain and could not be escaped from at one time, but
which later could be escaped.
The forced swim test is widely used to assess drugs that
may be useful for depression [6 1,621. A rat is dropped from
a specified height into a cylinder of water from which it
cannot escape. It swims frantically trying to escape for a
time, and then floats quietly with just its nose out of the
water. The swimming is usually interpreted as an adaptive
escape response and the floating as a pathological depressed
response. Imagine, however, a rat that falls into a natural
pond or river. Its survival depends on how accurately it
judges what strategy will work best, active struggle or
passive waiting. A rat that struggles to no purpose is
doomed. Drugs that relieve depression reliably increase
the time a rat struggles in the water [62,63]. This suggests
that antidepressants might increase the tendency to active
coping in other species in other situations, and might even
increase it beyond what would be optimal in the natural
habitat. It seems likely that selection has had plenty of
opportunity to optimize this parameter since breeding for
decreased activity in swim tests over 18 generations of rats
yielded individuals who were passive in general, and whose
swim times could be increased by chronic, but not acute,
treatment with antidepressants  [64].
This kind of thinking suggests quite specific experiments.
For instance, it would be interesting to train rats in a slowly
increasing reinforcement ratio in order to determine if, as
one would expect, the break point is near the point where
calories spent exceed those gained. Then, the effect of anti-
depressants could be assessed. If mood is, as suggested by
many, an adaptation for motivating disengagement from a
task that is no longer paying off  [65,66], then antidepres-
sants should not only increase persistence on the increasing
ratio task, they should increase it beyond the optimum.
Finally, an evolutionary approach suggests possible
connections between anxiety, stress and depression. The
epidemiological association of anxiety disorders and
depression is strong, and the order effect is  consistent-
about half of the patients with panic disorder will have
major depression 5 years later, but very few patients with
depression will have a pure anxiety disorder 5 years later
[67]. Proximate explanations have been proposed for this
finding, many based on a presumed defect that results in a
regular sequence of abnormalities. If the functional signifi-
cance of anxiety is considered, however, it seems likely that
a threat that creates anxiety may lead to an actual loss that
precipitates depression. Alternatively, the very experience
of panic symptoms inhibits normal life so completely for
many patients that their world constricts and their sources of
satisfaction dry up.
5. Individual differences
The goal of much research in biology and behavior is to
understand what makes individuals different, especially in902 R.M. Nesse /Neuroscience and Biobehavioral  Reviews 23 (I 999) 895-903
their susceptibility to mental disorders. As noted above,
proximate approaches are usually more germane for such
questions, but an evolutionary approach can also be helpful.
In particular, variation in the dangerousness of the environ-
ment, over either generations or locations, will create differ-
ent selective pressures that should maintain variability in
genes that influence this trait [68]. When successive genera-
tions of rodents show an increasingly population density
selection seems to decrease attack latency. Whether the
environment is crowded or not, a male mouse without a
territory has two options: either try to take over a territory,
or try to find an unoccupied territory. As density increases,
the fitness pay-off for looking for an unoccupied territory
must decrease, so it is not surprising that selection favors a
shorter attack latency. Since variation in population is such
a characteristic and important factor in the mouse environ-
ment, however, a facultative mechanism that adjusts strat-
egy as a function of changes in population density would
give great advantages, especially if sudden changes in popu-
lation density sometimes occur. In this case, an evolutionary
perspective cannot make a firm prediction that the system
exists, but it can suggest a search for such a system based on
its probable utility.
The focus of this article has been the adaptive signifi-
cance of anxiety, low mood and stress, so to prevent mis-
understanding, it is important to clearly state that much
anxiety and depression results from diseases such as major
depression and panic disorder. Furthermore, much physical,
and probably mental, illness results from the complications
of the stress response. The search for the etiology of these
disorders is a high priority. The argument here does not
undermine the hard-won recognition that these disorders
really are diseases. It does, however, suggest that, like
chronic pain and febrile seizures, they probably often
involve dysregulation of a normal defense. If that is correct,
it implies the need to use special research strategies that
begin by elucidating the normal mechanisms that mediate
the defense, and then proceed to study the mechanisms that
regulate the defense, and finally try to understand the  etio-
logical factors that disrupt the normal regulation mechan-
isms. Understanding the proximate mechanisms that
normally regulate these defenses, from molecules to
neurons to the transduction of social cues, will provide a
solid foundation for understanding why and how they
become dysregulated. Evolutionary approaches that focus
attention on their normal functions, how they were shaped
by natural selection, and how they are regulated, will be
essential in this enterprise.
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